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This paper considers an economy using a product that adds to a stock ofpollution. Examples that come
to mind are SO Z emissions from buming coal accumulating in the soil and C02 emissions from fossil
energy use which are retained in the atmosphere. The stock of pollutants is subject to natural decay,
albeit not necessarily ofthe simple often assumed linear type. [n addition, a clean or so-called backstop
technology is available that requires costly investments but is characterised by low variable costs (e.g.,
solar energy or wind power). The costly investments lead to a slow build-up of the capacity of the
backstop. On the modelling side, tlns is an essential extension of most of the literature that considers
the unrealistic case that a backstop is instantaneously available. ~e second extension the present paper
makes is to consider not only the planning problem but also competitive outcomes. One of the
interesting results is that stable limit cycles may characterise the socially optimal long run outcome as
well as the competitive equilibrium. In a competitive equilibrium pollution control policy is not
necessarily optimal in the sense ofcorresponding with the social optimum. Although cycling can occur
in a competitive equilibrium,just as in the social optimum, rela~cation ofthe control inereases the set of
parameter values for which complex and unstable behaviour arises.
1. Introduction
This paper considers an economy using a product that causes pollution emissions that accumulate (e.g.,
SOz accumulates in the soil, COz in the atmosphere). The pollution stock is subject to natural decay,
albeit not necessarily of the simple lineaz type. In addition, a clean or so-called backstop technology is
available that n~uires costly investment but can be exploited at low variable costs (say solar energy,
wind power, etc.). The costly investments lead to slow build-up ofthe capacity of the backstop. On the
modelling side, this offers an essential extension of most ofthe literature that considers the unrealistic
case that a backstop is instantaneously available. Indeed, the obvious fact that all conceivable backstop
technologies (say nuclear, solar, renewables) can impossibly overtake from one day to another such
lazge markets as the world energy market, is somewhat overlooked in the literature on backstops (for an
exception see Wirl (1991)). This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the introduction of such a
backstop including a complete stability analysis for the social optimum and a competitive equilibrium.
One ofthe interesting results of this framework is that stable limit cycles may characterise the socially
optimal long run outwme. In addition, the paper investigates a competitive equilibrium if the
externalities ofthe dirty good are not or not optimally internalised.
12. The model.
The following model is a straightforward amendment of the model studied by Withagen and Toman
(1996) to allow for a sluggish build-up of backstop capacities. Environmental pollution ( P) or
degradation of nature increases by the amount of pollution emitted to the environment, which is
assumed to be proportional to the consumption ofthe dirty product x, minus natural decay, A(P) :
(1) P(I) - x(t) - A(P(t)), P(~) - Po , given
The stock of pollution is modelled as in Withagen and Toman ( 1996), except for choosing a decay
function that covers both cases, decay increasing or decreasing with increasing stock ( A'~ 0 and
A' ~ 0)[n fact we assume that decay is inverted U-shaped and concave, A" ~ 0 . See Figure l for a
graphical illustration of the decay function. The familiar logistic function provides an arithmetical
example. A familiar and plausible motivation of this specification is that the pollutant has to be
`digested' by the natural environment. NaNral decay is low at low levels of pollution because the low
levels of pollution rarely interact w~th a corresponding, say, bacteria, as well as at high levels of
pollution because ofthe extensive load ofpollution hindering decay.
Figure 1. The decay function
2We consider a partial equilibrium framework where consumers have utility U from consumption and
aze indifferent with respect to the origin of the consumer good: the dirty good x or the backstop
product B. It is assumed that the instantaneous utility function U is strictly concave and strictly
increasing. The Inada conditions, U' (0) - oo and U' (ao) - 0, are assumed to hold. They will ensure
an interior solution. The marginal willingness to pay, U', describes the inverse demand function, i.e.,
the market clearing price given aggregate supplies. Existing pollution has social cost D that is strictly
increasing and convex. We do not treat the environment as providing raw materials or anything like
that. The costs of producing the dirty good, C(x,P), are assumed to be increasing and convex in
output x, C~ ~ 0, CA ? 0. The cost function may include pollution as an argument. Then costs are
increasing and convex in pollution, CP ~ 0, CPP ~ O, and the cost function is convex in (x, P) , so
that Ca CPP - C~ ~ 0. In that case we could also assume that pollution increases the marginal costs
of producing the dirty commodity, C~ ~ 0. In the sequel we assume that the costs depend on
production only. This dces not exclude the (likely) possibility that production costs increase with
pollution (e.g., requiring dams, filters and other largely fixed costs elements), because these (additive)
costs can be integrated in D, but it excludes that pollution increases the marginal costs ofproducing the
dirty good. The reason for this simplification is purely arithmetical because retaining the mixed
derivative complicates matters considerably, without adding further insights.
The extension we propose is to incorporate a backstop capacity that provides a clean substitute
free ofvariable costs and that is chazacterised by a sluggish build-up. The assumption ofzero variable
costs ensures that the installed capacity of the backstop technology is always utilised and thus
consumed. Consumption from the backstop can therefore be identified with the backstop capacity B.
Of course, zero variable costs are not essential. They just have to be lower than the costs ofthe dirty
product and the technology itselfmust be economically viable. The sluggish build-up is due to the fact
that the backstop is produced from a capital stock, say fusion or wind power plants, photovoltaic cells,
etc., which cannot be implemented at once for various reasons such as adjustment costs. Indeed, the
obvious fact that all conceivable backstop technologies can impossibly overtake from one day to
another such large markets as the world energy market is somewhat overlooked in the literature on
backstops. The accumulation ofthe backstop capacity is described as follows:
(2) B(t) - y(t)-8B(t),B(0) - 0
3Here y is the rate of investment in the backstop and 8 is the constant rate of depreciation. The
investment y in the backstop technology has costs I that are strictly increasing and convex
In thc following we will study the intertemporal evolution of both states, backstop technology
and pollution, under two different institutional arrangements: in a social optimum and in a competitive
equilibrium.
3. Socisl optimum
We start with an analysis of the social optimum. The objective is to determine optimal production of
the dirty commodity and investments in the backstop in order to maxunise the aggregate net present
value ofsocial welfare:
max je-" ~U(x(t) t B(t)) - D(P(t)) - C(x(t)) -1(y(t))~Ctt
1~(r~r(r)1 0
subject to (1) and (2). The discount rate is denoted by r.
Current social welfare includes the consumer surplus U, the external costs D due to existing
pollution, the investment costs 1, and the costs ofproducing the dirty goad C.
In order to solve the optimal control problem we define the current value Hamiltonian (omitting
the time argument t)
H(x, y, P,B) - U(x t B) - D(P) - C(x) - I(y) t~.[x - A(P)] t~e[y - SB]
Note that the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in states and controls, due to the concave objective and
given that the state P cames a negative shadow price ~.. Therefon:, the first order conditions together
with the transversality conditions are sufficient for an optimal program. The transversality conditions
are satisfied if the states and co-states converge to a finite steady state or remain bounded, as in the
case oflimit cycles.
The firstorder conditions for an interior solution are the Hamiltonian maximising conditions,
Hx - Q U'-C'f.i - 0
HY-O: -I'tp-0
4and the intertemporal evolution of the shadow prices ofthe stock of pollution .i and ofthe backstop
capacity Ft , given by:
~ -(rtA')AtD'
ft-(rtS)ft-U'
Ifwe assume that interior controls exist that are implicitly determined with the derivatives shown
above, then we can write x - X(B, ~,) and y- Y(lt), with X B- U"I(C"-U" ),
Xx -1l(C"-U"),Y~, -111". In the sequel it is assumed that there exist steady states where the
controls are indeed interior, e.g., due to the above mentioned [nada conditions. With regard to the points
we wish to make this is not restrictive. We shall also provide some examples where this is
straightforward to establish. Substitution ofthe optimal controls into state and co-state equations yields
the following canonical equation system:
P- X(B, ~.) - A(P)
B-Y(~t)-SB
~ - (r t A'(P))A t D'(P)
N-(r t S)P - U'(X(B,.i) t B)
From this system it follows that in the steady state r t A'~ 0, because the co-state of pollution is
negative.
Proposition l: Suppose that in the stationary state A'~ 0. Then the optimal steady state is
asymptotically locally stable.
The result follows from applying standard sufficiency criteria (such as developed by Brock,
Scheinkmann and others). The formal proof is relegated to Appendix A, where however other more
direct techniques are employed. The economic consequence ofthe result is that sufficient environmental
concem, implying that pollution is below what `nature' could digest, P such that A' (P) ~ 0, dces not
only lower stationary pollution but ensures stability as well. However, other cases might occur as well.
5Proposition 2:Ij stationary pollution is 'large' so that A'~ 0, then this steady state may be
asymptotically locally stable but it may also be unstable and, in particular, there may exist stable
limit cycles.
The existence of limit cycles means that the build-up of the backstop capacity in order to reduce
pollution and thus to lower the pressure on the environment, is followed by an increased consumption
of the dirty product as the backstop capacity depreciates. Yet at higher pollution levels, the backstop is
again pushed back into the market, and so on forever. The reason for the existence of limit cycles is
that the framework described by the differential equations (1) -(2) includes one of the routes to limit
cycles in strictly concave models addressed in Wírl ( 1996). More precisely, Wirl (1996) shows that
growth, in the case at hand amounting to r ~ aPI aP --A'(P) ~ Q is a necessary condition for
Hopf bifurcation, which ensures the existence of stable (and generic) limit cycles. However, the
restriction to steady states satisfying r t A' ~ 0 is not necessary, because accumulating pollution
beyond the point where r t A'- 0,which defines the optimal long run stock absent any pollution
externality, is suboptimal given the damage. Furthermore it is worth noting that while `growth' is
destabilising, the second dynamics r~ c~l cB --S ~ 0 is stabilising. Hence S~ 0 restricts the
domain of complexities even for A' ~ 0 up to the point of ensuring overall stability if the rate of
depreciation is sufficiently large. Or, the other way around, long lasting backstop (i.e., small
S)capacities are suitable to yield complex solutions including limit cycles. However, this restriction
imposed by S is implicit rather than explicit for the social optimum. It is discussed in detail in
appendix B.
The Hopfbifurcation theorem requires that three properties hold:
i) there exists a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues for a proper choice ofthe parameter that is
varied (called the critical value or bifurcation point).
ii) the derivative of the real part with respect to the parameter is different from zero so that the
critical value of the parameter separates the domains where the linearised system is stable
(possibly restricted to a`stable' manifold) fromthe domain of locally unstable spirals.
iii) a negative coefficient ofa quadratic term ofthe so-called nomial fonn (i.e., the system remains
stable at the critical value).
The first two conditions are sufficient for the existence ofa limit cycle. Yet ifcondition (iii) is violated
the cycle is unstable. That is, such a cycle repels all motions starting arbitrarily close to the cycle (and
within the stable manifold): motions starting inside the cycle converge to the steady states, those
starting outside the cyc(e either diverge or converge to another steady state (ifexisting). The geometric
intuition of the theorem is straightforward: at the point of the bifurcation, the steady state of the
6linearised system becomes a centre, but the non-linear system remains stable because of the negative
quadratic terms. Now for parameter values slightly beyond the critical value, there are two opposing
forces. First the negative quadratic term addressed in (iii) dominates the linear terms, at least
sufficiently offthe equilibrium. Second, close to the equilibrium this quadratic term is irrelevant so that
the linear terms, with positive real parts, lead to locally `exploding' spirals near the equilibrium. The
limit cycle arises from balancing these two forces and wnstitutes the attractor ofthis system. If on the
other hand the quadratic term is positive, a cycle requires that the linear terms provide the stabilising
elements so that the steady state is locally stable and the cycle becomes repelling. For further details
see Guckenheimer-Holmes (1983). In the following we will concentrate on condition (i). We will verify
the other conditions numerically.
In the context of our model the growth condition mentioned requires that A' ~ 0 meaning a
relatively large socially optimal pollution stock. Given this condition, very simple examples, with high
discount rates andlor highly convex investment costs, allow for a Hopf bifurcation and hence for stable
limit cycles. We consider an example with linear external costs D(P) - dP, linear production costs
C(x) - cx , quadratic consumer surplus U(z) - 1- yzZ , so that demand is lineaz with a maximal
willingness to pay of 1S and maximum demand of 1 unit, lineartluadratic investment costs
I(y) - ay t ~byZ , and logistic decay A(P) - P(1- P) . For the parameter values we choose
a- 0.1, c- 0.2, d- 0.3, D- 0.05 and r - 1.8. Thus the average lifetime of a backstop plant is 20
years. We use the parameter b, which detemtines the convexity of the investment costs, as our
bifurcation parameter. This approach leads to a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues ofthe Jacobian at
b- b~` - 6.56596..., where the derivative of the real part does not vanish and the bifurcation is
supercritical, i.e. the quadratic tertn of the normal form is negative so that the cycle is stable and not
repelling. This can be verified numerically using LOCBIF (see Khibnik et al. (1992)). The
corresponding Lyapunov number turns out to be -2.02042, so that limit cycles characterise the optimal
policy in a local, one-sided surrounding of b~ 6.56596... In Figure 2, we vary the adjustment cost
parameter b as indicated for the reported Hopf bifurcation that leads to the interesting result, that
`intermediate' and }tigh values induce limit cycles or instability, but low and very high values for b
imply stability. Of course, this instability results only upon entering the domain
P~ y- arg max A(P) so that A' ~ 0.
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Figurc 2. Stcady statcs versus the convexiry of investment costs, stability propemcs and Hopf
bifurcations
Figure 3 uscs thc discount rate as the bifurcation parameter, all other parameters as above and
h at the critical value for r- 1.8 . This leads to stable Hopf bifurcation too and it highlights at the







Figurc 3. Stationan~ solutions and stabiliry properties for different values of r.
limit cycles
or unstable
stable ác monotonic stable oscillations all eigenvalues
two e~gcmalues have havepcisitive
two negauve real eigenvalues , negeiwe real parts, real parts
8Remark: Setting 8- 0 and assuming !(0) - 0 implies the same steady state as reported in Withagen
and Toman (1996). The inclusion of adjustment costs can fundamentally alter the stability properties.
More precisely, the adjustment costs can destabilise an otherwise stable equilibrium, but cannot
stabilize an otherwise unstable equilibrium, see Feichtinger, Novak and Wirl (1994).
4. Competitive equilibris
In this section, we study the perfect foresight competitive equilibrium where the extemality is not at all





That is, the firm decides at each point of time how much to pollute and how much to expand the
backstop capacities, taking the market price p and the pollution stock as given. [n the objective
function r denotes the tax rate on the production of the dirty commodity, which is exogenous to the
firm.. Each individual firm neglects the damage function D and pollution does not enter the private
cost function either. Firm-specific feedback of pollution by means of the tax rate is now essential in
contrast to the social optimum where such feedbacks were included in D. Absent such a feedback, the
tragedy of the commons arises, ultimately destroying the environment's inherent abatement capabilities.
The consequences of such irreversibilities are analysed by Tahvonen and Withagen (1996) in the
context ofa planning problem. The irreversibility creates a non-concavity for the plaruung problem that
would be irrelevant in our competitive setting, because we are working in a decentralised economy.
The Hamiltonian ofthe system reads
H(x,Y, B, v) - P~x t B] - C(x) - zx - I(1') f ~y -~]
Assuming an interior solution we find as a first set of necessary conditions, again the
Hamiltonian ma~cimising conditions
9H~-p-C~-z-0
Hy - -1't v - 0
Another necessary condition describes the evolution of the single adjoint variable of the representative
firm's backstop capacity, denoted by v, to differentiate from the socially optimal solution where wc
used it:
v-(rt8)v-p
Market clearing at any instant oftime requires:
P(t) - U'(x(1) t B(t))
The optimal controls, i.e. the production of the dirty product and the investment in the
backstop interior controls are now implicitly defined by x` - X`(B;z) and y` - Y`(v), with
XB --U"I(U"-C"), Xr - 1I (U"-C") and Y` - 111". Moreover, equation l describing the
evolution ofthe stock ofpollution must hold. Although the competitive firms have no control over the
stock of pollution, they anticipate the evolution ofpollution perfectly (rational expectations). Therefore,
the competitive equilibrium is described by the following system ofdifferential equations:
B - Y`(v) - 8B
v-(r t8)v - U'(X`(B; z) t B)
P - X`(B;r)-A(P)
Proposition 3: Suppose the tax rate is set such that it solves z --.ï, where ~i is the co-srate of the
polfution stock in the socia! optlmum, and satisfies ~ï -(r t A')~ t D' and a transversality
condition. Then the competitive equilibrium is identical to the socia! optimum.
Proof: Addition ofthis differential equation for ~, to the competitive equilibrium and replacing z by
-.ï yields the same system as in section 3 except for a different labelling of v instead of ft .
This proposition identifies the interrelationship between a competitive equilibrium and the
social optimum. It leads immediately to the corollary that competitive equilibria allow for limit cycles
10too. Nevertheless we study in the following also competitive equilibrium where internalisation is
possibly sub-optimal, so that the tax rate is not equal to the negative of the shadow price of pollution.
Proposition 4: Suppose that the steady state is in the domain of A'~ 0. Then the steady state is
asymptotically locally stable.
This proposition is completely analogous to proposition 1. The next two propositions
mvestigate the domain A'~ 0.
Proposition 5: Suppose that the tax rate s is constant over time. Then a steady state in the domain
oj A'~ 0 is (generically) unsrable, i.e., only one eigerrvalue is negarive so that the stability is
restricted to a one-dimensional manijoldof the initial conditions in the (P, B) -plane.
The instability addressed in proposition 5 is usually associated with multiple equilibria with the
consequence that applying even the long run optimal tax is insufficient, ifinitial pollution is large. Note
that the instability addressed in proposition 5 can occur in all other cases considered in this paper. This
may be surprising to some of the readers given the strid andjoint concavity of our model, since in the
literature most of these kinds ofinstabilities aze associated with (local) convexities.
An immediate consequence of proposition 5 is that we have to extend the analysis so as to
allow for a tax that is increasing in pollution, to get complex solutions. The reason is that the kind of
instability addressed in proposition 5 excludes local instabilities of the kind required for a Hopf
bifurcation, where two eigenvalues must have negative real parts. The relationt- t(P) may cover to
some extent not only the tax but also other adversities to the finn related to pollution, such as thc
increase of marginal costs ofproducing the dirty good. Substitution ofthis modification into the above
differential equation system characterises the competitive equilibrium facing a state contingent, instead
ofa constant orjust time~ependent, tax rate.
Proposition 6: Instabilities and limit cycles can characterise a competitive equilibrium with a
stationarypollution such that A' ~ 0. However, the domainfor complexities in competitive equilibria
is not restricted 6y the discount rate ojthe (representativeJ firm, i.e., r f A'~ 0 is a possible long
run outcome under competition. Yet depreciadon restricts the domain of possible complexities oj
limit cycles to sufficiently long lasting capacities,S t A'~ Q so that jor S- 0 the entire domain
A' ~ 0 permits complexities.
11The reason for this restriction is the stability inherent to the accumulation of the backstop
capacities. In contrast to the social optimum an explicit bound can be given concerning the domain of
complex solutions. An example establishing the claim of limit cycles in Proposition 6 run as follows. It
borrows from the social planning example the specifications of the surplus, U(z) - z- ~zr, and of
the investmcnt costs, I(y) - ay t'z by~ , but assumes quadratic production costs C(x) - 'Z cx2,
decay slightly different from the logistic one, A(P) - P(1- ~) , and firm specific taueslcosts lineaz
in pollution, r(P) - sP. A theoretical discussion and details concerning this example are given in the
appendix A. Setting the parameters a- O.l,c - O.OS,r - 0.3,5 - O.OS,s - 0.1, yields a Hopf
bifurcation for variations in b at b - 3.870334 (i.e., a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues satisfying
the conditions about a non-zero crossing velocity and having a negative Lyapunov number -0.0332
according to the calculations performed with LOCBIF). The resulting steady state of large pollution
exceeds pollution feasible for a socially optimal programme and thus highlights that the domain of
complex policies is enlarged for competitive outcomes.
Figure 4 shows on the left hand side the evolution of the steady states and the corresponding
stability properties for the intertemporal, competitive equilibrium associated with the above mentioned
bifurcation but considering variations in the discount rate r instead of b. For the purpose of
comparison, the right-hand side shows the social optimum, which leads to comparable pollution. Tlus
is achieved by setting d- 005 , so that the tax leads to similar steady states with rather lazge pollution
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Figure 4. Steady states as a function ofthe diswunt rate and the associated stability properties.
125. Concluding remarks
It has been shown that with sluggish build-up ofa backstop technology complex behaviour of pollution
and backstop capacity can arise, in a social optimum as well as in a wmpetitive equilibrium. A
remarkable result is that in a competitive equilibrium with nomoptimal taxation the scope for such
behaviour is larger. This fact has bcen established by means of a numerical example. Figure 5
summarises these general findings.





Figure 5. Comparison ofthe stabiliry properties ofsocial planning and competition
The basic reason for this phenomenon of limit cycles is that the consideration of negative marginal
decay introduces `growth', which is a pathway for Hopf bifurcation and thus for limit cycles in strictly
wncave dynamic optimisation models. Local convexities substantially simplify the derivation of limit
cycles from the first order conditions, but these conditions are not sufficient anymore. Wirl (1996)
shows this for planning problems and Wirl (1997) for competitive equilibria. The reason for the
differences between the social optimum and the competitive equilibrium is that the accumulation of
pollution beyond the stock where r t A' - 0 is always socially suboptimal, but it is a feasible outcome
under competition if the extemality is insufficiently internalised.
There are two extensions ofthis reseazch that are worth pursuing. First it would be interesting
to investigate the effect of introducing variable costs associated with the production from the backstop
technology. Second, and more importantly, it is worthwhile to see if set-up costs for the backstop
technology would drastically alter the main results.
13Acknowledgement. The authors wish to thank Jercen van den Bergh and Peter Kort for their
comments on an earlier version of the paper. All remaining errors are ours.
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14AppendiY A: Stability analysis in the social optimum
The Jacobian ofthe system ofdifferential equations discussed in section 3 is:
J-
aP aP a~ aP
áP áa á~ áu
a8 a8 a8 aá
áP áa á~. á,~
a~. a~, a~ a~.
áP áa á~ áu
a;~ au au aw
áP áa á~. á,~
All the elements this matrix are evaluated at the steady state. The stability properties of this canonical
equations system may be studied applying the global asymptotic stability criteria developed in the
seventies by Brock, Malliaris, Rockefeller, Scheinkman and others, which are well summarised in the
book of Brock and Malliaris (1989). However, we opt for a local stability analysis following Dockner




















The formufa allows for a complete characterisation of the local dynamics of the linearised system and
provides the ideal test recommended in Brock-Malliaris (1989, bottom of p. 148). For the general case
ofsection 3 we have:
- A' C~~-U~ ~ C„-U„ ~ U~~ ' 1
J-
1
0 - 6' 0 -
I"
A"~. t D" 0 r f A' 0
U"C" U"
0 -C~,-U~~ -C~~-U~~ rt8
ISCalculation ofthe coefficients in Dockner's fonnula yields for K
A"~ t D" C"U"
K--A'[rtA']-8[rtS]- t C~~-U„ ~„[C„-U„]
All terms except for the first term - A'[r t A'] are definitely negative due to the assumed sewnd
order derivatives and due to the fact the stationary shadow price of pollution, ~--D'I(r f A'), is
negative. The determinant equals:
ójrtS][[.iA"tD"] U"[.iA"tD"tA'C"[rtA']]
det(J) - d9'[rt 8][rt A'] t
C"-U" - 1"[C"-U"]
According to the above calculatíons, low pollution i.e., A'~ 0, implies K ~ 0 and
det(J) ~ 0. In view of Dockner's formula these inegualities are sufficient for J to have two
eigenvalues, which aze either negative or have negative real parts. That implies saddtepoint stability,
albeit that damped oscillation may be optimal, since the eigenvalues of the stable manifold can be
complex (as shown in the example in the main text). This proves proposition 1.
We show next that proposition 2 holds. First, A' ~ 0 still allows for stability. This follows
directly from the above calculations because A' ~ 0 is compatible with K ~ 0 and det(J) ~ 0, which
in tum are sufficient for saddlepoint stability. The example in Figure 2 shows that even local
monotonicity is possible for A'~ 0. The existence of limit cycles according to the Hopf bifurcation
theorem requires inter alia the existence of a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues. In Dockner's
formula this implies
det(J)-(Kl2)Z trZKl2, K~0
which in turn requires that the determinant is positive too.
According to the above calculation, K~ 0 requires A'~ 0. Ironically enough, this negative
derivative introduces `growth', which according to Wirl (1996) is a pathway for limit cycles. As
mentioned eazlier, Wirl (1996) shows that growth, i.e. r ~ o~P~o~P --A'~ 0, is a necessary condition
for Hopf bifurcation in strictly concave dynamic optimisation models and of the possible pathways
only this one is present. Although his theorem is, strictly speaking, not applicable because of its
restriction to a single control, the consequence on K~ 0 is tied to A' ~ 0. However, depreciation of the
backstop capacities adds a stabilising (i.e. negative) factor in K so that A' [rf A' ] must at least
16outweigh S[S t r]. Hence, long lasting investments aze helpful for K~ 0, a prerequisite for complex
solutions such as limit cycles.
For the example in Section 3 we obtain the optimal controls,
x' --B - c t.i,Y' - [N - a] I b. The canonical equations (retainíng A - P[1-P] and







-A' -1 1 0
0 -S 0 llb
- 2.i 0 rt A' 0
0 0 1 rt8
This system allows for a closed form analytical solution, ofthe steady states and even of the critical
value of the bifurcation parameter, at least for the parameter b. However, all these expressions are
extremely cumbersome so that we report here only the crucial coefficient K.
K--A'[rtA']t2~.-S[rtS].
Fairly similar aze the results for the example in Section 4(albeit we could not obtain a closed








This system yields the following Jacobian:
J-









0 -S 0 llb




Although the following analysis allows for taxes depending on pollution we start with the case where




[U.~-C~~ ] rt8 0
- U"
0 - A'I
Again the stability properties can be obtained from calculating the eigenvalues of the Jacobian. The
eigenvalues are the roots ofthe characteristic polynomial:
18p(e) - e' - tr(J)e2 t k e- det(J)
where k is thc sum of the principal minors of dimension 2 ofthe lacobian. It plays a role similar to K










Since A' ~ 0 implies det(.n ~ 0, an instability arises whenever A' ~ 0 and thus the impossibility of
limit cycles. This verifies proposition 5. For A' ~ 0 we have det(.n ~0 as well as k ~ 0, which are
sufficient for saddlepoint stability (in fact sufficient for real eigenvalues and thus for local
monotonicity). Therefore, the existence of complex competitive equilibria requires a state coMingent
effect, either as a tax or through a feedback on costs.Taking into account r- r(P)in the system derived
in section 4 and applying the chain rule yields the following lacobian:


















From det(J) ~ 0 it follows that either one eigenvalue, say e~ , is positive and the other two (say ez and
e~) are negative, or all three are positive. Since k - e~[e~ t e2 ] t e~eZ , k ~ 0 is only possible if both
e2 and ej aze negative (because they cannot have opposite sign due to the fact that det(J) ~ 0) .
Therefore, the properties k ~ 0anddet(J) ~ 0 are sufficient for saddlepoint stability. Similazly,
det(J) ~ 0 combined with tr(J) ~ 0 is sufficient for saddlepoint stability.
The existence ofa pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues as a necessary condition for a Hopf
bifurcation requires that det(J) - tr(J)k and that all elements of this equation are positive.
Therefore, again the sum the principal minors of dimension 2 must be positive, k~ 0. Again A' ~ 0 is
helpful for a positive trace and a positive k, but can lead to a negative detemtinant, which implies an
instability, yet simultaneously excluding limit cycles. However, A' ~ 0 is not sufficient since k ~ 0
demands at the minimum S t A' ~ 0. The reason is similar to the social optimum: A' ~ 0 introduces
growth into the externality and thus helps to destabilise the system while aBI aB --S destabilises
the system. Hence instabilities of any kind require that the destabilising element must outweigh the
stabilising element S t A' ~ 0. However, in contrast to the social optimum, low diswunt rates do not
constrain the domain of feasible equilibria so that r t A'~ 0 is feasible.
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